

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF SOVIET DISSENT

by

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL
ANGELO DE GUTTADAURO
US ARMY RESERVE**

On January 25th, 1977, Andrei Dimitrievich Sakharov, one of the Soviet Union's most brilliant physicists, was summoned before the Prosecutor General of the USSR and ordered to recant a statement he and other dissidents had made regarding a bomb explosion that had taken place earlier that month in a Moscow subway. In the statement, Sakharov and the others intimated that the blast, in which six or seven passengers had been killed and numerous others injured, had been executed by the Committee of State Security (KGB) in an attempt to place increasing pressures on dissidents within the Soviet Union. Although he has thus far refused to modify his original statement, the famous Russian dissident has not been jailed by the authorities. Nevertheless, it would have been unthinkable for a man of Sakharov's stature to have made such an attack on the police arm of the Communist Party during the Khrushchev regime. But dissent in the USSR has increased greatly over the past decade. More importantly, it has changed qualitatively, effectively undergoing a metamorphosis that increasingly threatens the very basic political and philosophical underpinnings of the Soviet Communist State.

Events in the Soviet Union since 1965, roughly corresponding to the Kosygin and Breshnev era, testify to this trend and to the growing articulation of the objectives of the liberal intelligentsia. As a group, it has expanded to include not only the scientists and literary figures of great repute in Moscow, but also some minor figures in other walks of life and in other parts of Russia. Evidence of the nature of the current phase of dissent can be seen in the wave of trials, the battles over censorship in the writers' unions, the appearance of an underground press, and the public and private debates among various elements in Soviet society. Almost daily, the media carry new reports of turmoil and unrest in the Soviet Union and various Soviet Bloc nations as well. A growing cohesion in organization, a greater unity of purpose and method, and a more refined ability to express their demands have made the intelligentsia a formidable force for liberalization in the

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USSR. The extreme momentum of this force was most recently demonstrated when Sakharov, as its leading spokesman, received an unprecedented personal letter of encouragement and support directly from the President of the United States.

Enough, then, has transpired within the Soviet intellectual establishment to warrant a reexamination of some of the characteristics of dissent outlined by Brzezinski and Huntington in their book, *Political Power: USA/USSR*. According to the authors, dissent in an ideological system takes two forms: orthodox and unorthodox. Orthodox dissent "involves efforts to lift ideological controls on the grounds that their removal will actually benefit both society and the political system."¹ Unorthodox dissent, on the other hand, "involves primarily the intellectual rejection of the system"² and attempts "to provide an ideological alternative to the system."³ In other words, attempts to improve the existing system by working through channels sanctioned by the system "and in keeping with its underlying ideological values"⁴ is orthodox and, hence, legitimate. Dissent which provides an inherent indictment of the fundamental basis of the system itself, however, coupled with an almost total personal disaffection with it, constitutes unorthodox dissent and is proscribed.

In the post-Stalin era, dissent within the USSR had fallen haphazardly into both categories, with orthodox dissent forming the bulk of the system's known criticism. Yet in recent years, a gradual shift can be detected whereby unorthodox dissent has become more vocal, more visible, and more articulate. In essence, dissent in the literary and scientific communities has undergone a perceptible transformation from virtual nonexistence under Stalin, to piecemeal attempts to improve the system under Khrushchev, to present-day attempts to change the very basis and scope of the system by providing, albeit inchoately at this stage, an alternative to it. Citing the Soviet condemnation of Yevtushenko and Ehrenburg in 1963, Brzezinski and Huntington surmised that "in an ideological system even orthodox

dissent eventually tends to become unorthodox."⁵ This paper will illustrate how dissent, in some quarters of the Soviet intelligentsia, has progressed from the orthodox to the unorthodox in the last few years.

BEGINNINGS: THE FIRST MILESTONE

In early 1956, Khrushchev delivered his famous "secret speech" in which he denounced the crimes of Stalin and set in motion a period of mild liberalization in Soviet society. Creative artists, especially writers, began to question the official aesthetic socialist realism, in an effort to represent human experience in more realistic terms. Socialist realism required the "depiction of a highly colored Socialist world in which all is bright, happy and clear, without any doubts or ambiguities, and which is represented in forms which are immediately understandable."⁶ These creative artists called for a greater degree of sincerity, for truth in literature, and for a closer relationship between art and life, all of which were singularly lacking in the arts during the Stalinist era.

In tandem with Khrushchev's policy of destalinization, the artistic community sought to eliminate the remaining influence of Zhdanov, Stalin's cultural overseer, who had imposed rigid party controls over literature and the arts through censorship and control over publishing houses. The scientific community was also active in attempts to remove the influence of Stalin's "court scientist," Trofim Lysenko, from the disciplines of genetics and molecular biology which retarded Soviet science for nearly a generation. This combination of effort grew to such a degree that by 1971, *Newsweek* magazine would proclaim that this union of the artistic and scientific intelligentsia is the most important milestone in the course of Soviet dissent since the death of Joseph Stalin eighteen years ago."⁷ The years between 1956 and 1965, then, were a period of great ferment in which the liberal elements of the literary and scientific communities were

demanding—and sometimes obtaining—a greater latitude to conduct their work.

The developments within Soviet culture and science during this period were characterized by as many setbacks as advances, and the conflicts with the conservative elements in the Soviet Union demonstrated that the intellectual currents in Soviet society were intertwined with the policy and politics of the political leadership. The ambivalent and oftentimes contradictory cultural policies of Khrushchev helped to generate a climate in which various forms of dissent could exist, but not necessarily flourish. The intra-party conflicts reflected the divisions within the political leadership over censorship, contact with the West, and the extent to which the party should allow increased freedom in the arts and sciences. The intelligentsia, comprising the liberal elements of the literary and scientific communities, soon realized that increased freedom was tied to continued destalinization and that the gains already made could only be sustained through vigorous efforts on their part.

FROM MILESTONE TO LANDMARK

In September 1965, Andrei Sinyavsky, a literary critic, and Yuli Daniel, a translator, publishing under the respective pseudonyms of Abram Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak, were secretly arrested by the Soviet police. After five months of interrogation, they were brought to trial (in what was to become the Soviet Union's Dreyfus case) and indicted under article 70 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code (RSFSR) which deals with "propaganda conducted for the purpose of undermining the state." They were charged with being "hostile to the policy of the Soviet government and party"⁸ because, it was alleged, their works were being printed abroad and were being used in the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. Sinyavsky and Daniel were subsequently convicted and given the maximum sentence under the article.

Their trial was a significant landmark in the development of intellectual opposition to the government for several reasons. The trial was

the first instance in Soviet history whereby writers were tried as criminals for what they had written and their works used in evidence against them. In addition, Sinyavsky and Daniel pleaded not guilty to the charge, while freely admitting that they permitted their works to be published in the West. They based their defense on the grounds that their actions did not violate existing laws and claimed that they were being prosecuted instead for what they had written.

Sinyavsky argued that "nobody has ever been held criminally responsible for his creative activity"⁹ and that "judicial standards cannot be applied to literature."¹⁰ Daniel contended that "literature is entitled to deal with any period and with any questions... there should be no forbidden subjects in the life of society."¹¹ Both Sinyavsky and Daniel defended their work on literary grounds, holding that the state had no right to read into the creative process anti-Soviet intent. Even if "class enemies" construed anti-Soviet intent from their writing, the authors argued that they could not be held accountable since their work was not published in violation of any laws.

Sinyavsky remarked in his final plea that "authors are not identical with the characters they create,"¹² turning the trial into an elementary lesson in literary criticism. Daniel went further by correctly implying that the

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trial itself was based not on literary but on political grounds: "We are guilty not for what we have written but for having sent our works abroad."¹³ Although the prosecution did focus its arguments on the content of their works, it became increasingly evident that the trial was motivated by political considerations and represented an attempt by the hard-line Stalinists in the political leadership to slow down and dampen dissent.

The implications of the trial were not lost on the liberal elements in Soviet society. They realized that, in the future, literary works might be regarded as crimes, and that the problem of persecution and prosecution by the authorities transcended the limitations of socialist legality. Reaction among many of the other intellectuals was rapid but not always publicized. Sixty-three Moscow writers signed a letter addressed to the forthcoming 23d Party Congress protesting the conduct of the trial on procedural grounds. While not approving of the means Sinyavsky and Daniel used in publishing their works abroad, the joint letter claimed that the pair's intent was not anti-Soviet and that the prosecution "failed to prove the existence of such malicious intent."¹⁴

The Moscow writers went on to say that "the condemnation of authors for the writing of satirical works creates an extremely dangerous precedent and could impede the progress of Soviet culture. Learning and art," they continued, "cannot exist if neither paradoxical ideas can be expressed nor hyperbolic images used as an artistic device . . . we need more, not less, freedom for intellectual and artistic experiment."¹⁵ Five members of the Institute of Linguistics addressed another unpublished letter to Party Leader Brezhnev which pointed out that Sinyavsky and Daniel were tried on the basis of their works but did not receive the benefit of a literary analysis to vindicate them from charges of anti-Soviet intent.¹⁶ The trial brought into focus the real issues, which were the viability of socialist realism as an all-embracing theory of art and the effectiveness of socialist legality in protecting the civil rights of the accused.

If the trial was intended by the more

conservative elements of the Soviet leadership to intimidate the liberal intelligentsia into a more passive acceptance of party controls, it failed and instead generated the opposite reaction. In effect, it served to radicalize and mobilize many of the younger artists and greatly alarmed the older members of the group. The trial graphically defined the issues at stake, by forcing the intelligentsia to clarify their own views in order to defend their position.

The literary intellectuals now shifted their concern from artistic truth and sincerity to political demands to safeguard intellectual freedom. Intellectual freedom could no longer be maintained unless there were political freedoms coupled with legal guarantees to insure basic civil liberties. Moreover, the creative process itself, whether in the arts or the sciences, had to be liberated from the restraints imposed by the party *apparatchiki* (officials). Scientists and writers began to realize that freedom in one field of endeavour could exist only if it prevailed in other areas. The petitions and letters sent to the newspapers and government leaders bore to an increasing extent not only the signatures of scientists and writers, but also those of minor figures in the Soviet intellectual establishment. Such a response clearly testified to the growth and spontaneity of the dissent movement.

By far the most significant letter to appear in the aftermath of the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial was addressed to Brezhnev and the 23d Party Congress by several prominent members of the scientific community.¹⁷ Andrei Sakharov (one of the developers of the Soviet hydrogen bomb), Nobel physicist Igor Tamm, and physicist Pyotr Kapitza directed a strong call to the Party leadership to resist any pressure to rehabilitate Stalin or his methods. In obvious reference to the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial, they asked for more freedom in which to experiment and for safeguards to maintain civil liberties. The progress of intellectual freedom was thus tied to further destalinization. Legal guarantees of civil liberties, however, suffered a setback in September of 1966 when articles 142 and 190 of the Criminal Code were amended (the

latter to provide three years in prison for "discrediting the Soviet State and social order" and for the "organization of or participation in group activities which violate the public order").¹⁸ The effect of these amendments was to make it easier, legally speaking, to clamp down on dissent and its literature and at the same time have the sanction of law.

THE CHANGING FACE OF DISSENT

The Sinyavsky and Daniel trial not only challenged socialist realism on literary grounds, but also set in motion another challenge to socialist legality. The next two political trials were directly related to the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial and amplified even more some of the demands of the intellectuals for more freedom. In early 1967, Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov, the editors of two underground periodicals, were arrested. A few days later, a protest demonstration against the arrests took place in Pushkin square in Moscow. Several of the demonstrators, including their leader, Vladimir Bukovsky, were themselves arrested. Bukovsky was brought to trial the following September and defended his actions during the demonstration on the grounds that the right to hold demonstrations was guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution.

In his defense, he recited the preamble and the text of Article 125 of the Constitution, which outlines freedom of speech, press, and assembly (including street processions and demonstrations). He declared that "it is completely clear that neither legally nor grammatically is it possible to interpret this preamble as meaning that the freedoms listed in this article, including the freedoms of meetings and demonstrations, are permitted only on condition that they be exercised with the aims mentioned in this preamble."¹⁹ He also called for the revision of Article 70 of the Criminal Code (under which Sinyavsky and Daniel had been tried), calling it arbitrary and imprecise, since it should conform with Article 125 of the Constitution. In spite of his spirited defense, Bukovsky was sentenced to the maximum penalty under the law: three years in a forced labor camp.

The Ginsburg-Galanskov trial itself was held in early January 1968, a full year after they were arrested, for violation of this same Article 70 of the Criminal Code. Earlier, in December 1967, former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko had formulated a petition criticizing the delay in the proceedings and demanding that their trial begin immediately. Grigorenko, who had lost his rank and endured a 14-month confinement in a mental institution because of his active support of the protest movement, and Pavel Litvinov, a physicist and grandson of a former foreign minister, circulated a second petition calling for an open trial for Ginsburg and Galanskov. It was denied by the Moscow Municipal Court, and the trial was held virtually in secret, with only Party faithfuls allowed entrance.

Ginsburg was accused of compiling and sending abroad a "white book," a detailed account of the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial. Galanskov was accused of editing *Phoenix 66*, an underground periodical, and of accepting money from an emigré organization in the West. Slander against the Soviet system and anti-Soviet intent were again charged by the prosecution under Article 70, as in the earlier Sinyavsky and Daniel trial. Both Ginsburg and Galanskov defended themselves against the charges, but they were eventually convicted and received harsh sentences. After the trial, Litvinov and Larisa Bogoraz—wife of Yuli Daniel and herself a master of philological sciences at that time in Siberian exile—addressed a letter to "world opinion" in which they criticized the court and the KGB for violating the rights of the defendants during the preliminary proceedings and during the trial itself.

This series of trials had raised basic questions concerning the relationship between dissent and the political system. Litvinov was quoted after the Ginsburg-Galanskov trial as saying that "my protest is against illegality and injustice but not against the political system."²⁰ No doubt, he expressed the view of a large part of the liberal intelligentsia, at least those who signed letters and petitions to the court and to political leaders concerning the

irregularities of the trials. Litvinov and others argued that, although the existing procedural norms were adequate, they were violated in practice by the police in the preliminary investigations and by the courts during the trials.

The illegally long pretrial investigations, the interruptions by the judges of the defendants' pleas, and the closed nature of the trial comprised repeated violations of the norms of socialist legality. Implied in this criticism, however, was an acceptance of the tenets of socialist legality itself and its underpinnings in the political system. Violations of it did not provide an inherent indictment of the judicial, legal, or political system. Justice and legality could be served if the procedural norms were observed. This does not constitute a structural criticism of the political system nor provide an alternative to it.

"The question," as Stephen Weiner phrased it, "is whether the violations that occurred during the recent trials were solely the result of express but secret regime direction, or whether there is something in the norms themselves that permits, or indeed requires, a political direction as a normal course."²¹ In short, is the legal and constitutional system subordinate to the political system, or are the two distinct in theory as well as practice? Furthermore, does political interference in a trial jeopardize its fairness from a procedural point of view? To answer these questions, it is necessary to make a distinction between socialist *legal consciousness* and socialist *legality*. "Socialist legal consciousness requires the interpretation of Soviet laws in the light of their assumedly objective ideological underpinnings."²² Socialist legality is "the demand that laws be obeyed." It assumes that existing statutes, both procedural and substantive, are just and consequently should be unswervingly followed in judicial practice.

Weiner continues:

Socialist legal consciousness, however, goes beyond socialist legality. It directs the judge toward an objective standard, because legal consciousness is assumed to be not a personal but a collective understanding of the laws. This objective

standard embraces socialist democratism and humanism, proletarian internationalism, and the *partiinost* [party principle] underlying Soviet law and giving rise to the principle of socialist legality.²³

The judges interpret socialist legality in the context of the Party line or policy at the time; the judges are the creatures of the Party. The defendants in the three trials and their allies were correct in protesting the violations of the procedures of socialist legality and should have been acquitted if procedural norms were not dependent on their interpretation by the Party. But the norms of socialist legality are only a part of the corpus of socialist legal consciousness. The vagueness of the indictments and the arbitrary way in which the judge and the prosecution conducted the trials were the legal expression of the will of the Party.

Socialist legal consciousness stipulates that the judge and prosecution look to Party policy for guidance in applying a given statute to a case. The result is that the legal and constitutional systems are subordinate to Party policy. "Socialist legal consciousness provides the mechanism by which the political demands of the Party, clothed in ideological garb, can impinge on the conduct of the trial."²⁴ The defendants were in opposition to the Party and suffered the consequences at the trials. The Party merely used the courts to carry out its will instead of using more conventional Stalinist measures. Appeals to socialist legality alone are not sufficient to consider the trial a manifestation of unorthodox dissent. The dissidents, in a sense, by accepting even the rudiments of socialist legality as a criterion, tacitly accepted the whole basis of the legal system.

But a more careful analysis of the texts of the defense pleas and the petitions circulated on the defendants' behalf leaves the impression that more than mere orthodox dissent was at issue. The appeals by the defendants to "constitutionality," not just in the procedural sense of safeguards for accused persons, but in the substantive sense of guarantees of the free exercise of certain

basic rights theoretically protected by the Constitution, constitutes unorthodox dissent. In essence, the trials were used as an attempt to free the legal and constitutional system from manipulation by the Party and became a structural criticism on the part of the dissidents.

Looking back to the trial of the demonstration leader Bukovsky, one notes that in his final pleas before the court, he drew attention to the vagueness of the relationship of Article 70 of the Criminal Code to Article 125 of the Constitution, because the former was being used to infringe upon the precepts of the latter. He implied in this comparison, after finding Article 70 "subject to too wide an interpretation," that the Constitution should be the criterion for judges and not socialist legal consciousness or the Party policy prevailing at the moment. If his suggestion became reality, the Constitution would be supreme and immune to political pressure. This would result in separating the law and the courts from the dictates of Party policy. Moreover, this called into question the preeminence of the Party as the basis of the political system and substituted a "rule of law" which would operate autonomously and distinct from the Party. The legal and political systems would therefore be effectively separated—nothing short of revolutionary in a totalitarian ideological system.

Bukovsky's final plea also contained another feature of unorthodox dissent concerning the ends of all political activity and the ends of the state itself. He argued that freedom of speech, press, and assembly can be exercised not just "in conformity with the interests of the working people," or, "to strengthen the Socialist system," as stipulated in the preamble to Article 125 of the Constitution. These rights are ends in themselves and do not need Party direction for the articulation of the goals or for their implementation. In his defense of Bukovsky, Grigorenko argued that "the Supreme Court must put into effect the basic law of the socialist state" (the Constitution of the USSR) and that "judges are independent and only responsible to the law."²⁵

An independent judiciary, then, is the hallmark of a constitutional system. One can conclude that the demands of Bukovsky and Grigorenko "in view of the peculiar character of the Soviet state . . . would (if implemented) have had a profound effect on the basic features and operations of the Soviet regime."²⁶ According to the definition of Brzezinski and Huntington, the dissent of Litvinov, for example, would be orthodox, because it was criticism which accepted the basic and underlying premises of socialist legality. The dissent of Grigorenko and Bukovsky would be unorthodox because it challenged the very basis of the political system and provided an alternative to it in the form of constitutionality.

SAMIZDAT, SOLZHENITSYN, AND SAKHAROV

Defiance of restrictions placed on publishing works unofficially was the immediate cause of the three main political trials outlined thus far. The battle over censorship continued to be reflected in the debates among writers and artists and in the flourishing underground newspapers and periodicals, or *samizdat*. *Samizdat*, translated as "we publish ourselves," was a novel attempt to circumvent the restrictions placed on controversial works refused publication by the state publishing houses. Many of the Soviet Union's most gifted and creative writers have been refused official publication in their own land, and some of their works have eventually gotten into one or more of the *samizdat*. To the liberal intelligentsia, *samizdat* has become an important vehicle of communication about events that affect them. The 400-page minutes of the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial, the 1969 treatise by Sakharov, and some of the works of Solzhenitsyn were first published in various *samizdat*.

Prior to the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial, *samizdat* periodicals were mainly devoted to printing works by minor literary figures who were experimenting with new forms, and relatively little of political or social significance appeared. After the trial,

samizdat literature shifted markedly in content from literary pursuit to political topics. It published the letters and petitions of those who opposed the political trials and was the cause of, at least, the Ginsburg-Galanskov trial.

Harrassment by the KGB and other police agencies ended the publication of most of them. One which survived until recently, the *Chronicle of Current Events*, adopted as its motto—and repeated in every edition—Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the Soviet Union signed in 1948. This article states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and import information through any medium and regardless of frontiers.” It has become the *leitmotif* of intellectuals who are pressuring the government and its official publishing houses for more freedom to pursue their own interests.

In May 1967, novelist and later Nobel prize winner Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn addressed a letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers condemning censorship by government agencies in all its forms. His *Gulag Archipelago* and his unprecedented 1974 expulsion were still years ahead, but his words typified the scathing attacks that had already cost him over twelve years in forced labor and Siberian exile. In his letter, he charged that “censorship—which is not provided for in the Constitution and is therefore illegal, and which is nowhere publicly labelled as such—imposes a yoke on our literature and gives people unversed in literature arbitrary control over writers.”²⁷ He attacked censorship because works of artists were rejected by editors, not on literary grounds, but because they could not get approval from the state censorship agency, *Glavlit*. As a result, writers were inhibited from expressing their “cautionary judgment about the normal life of man and society, or to explain in their own way the social problems and historical experience that have been so deeply felt in our country.”²⁸

Censorship, he continued, was based on

“petty, egotistical, and shortsighted” considerations and not on the literary merits of the works submitted. Consequently, Soviet literature had lost both the confidence of the Soviet people and its standing in world literature. In unequivocal terms, he called for the end of censorship in all its manifestations. Solzhenitsyn was vehemently attacked for the letter by the neo-Stalinists in the writers’ union and passionately defended by several of the Soviet Union’s most talented writers and poets.

Solzhenitsyn’s appeal had little effect toward lifting censorship, but the letter is noteworthy for its appeal to the Constitution as a criterion for the evaluation of institutions. He notes that censorship is justified not from a legal or constitutional basis, but from the long years of practice by the police in the name of the political system. In asking for an effective use of Article 125 of the Constitution, Solzhenitsyn reiterates the complaint of Bukovsky and Grigorenko. Its implication is that all the practices of the political system must be subordinated to the law as embodied in the Constitution. This falls into the same category of unorthodox dissent as that of Bukovsky and Grigorenko.

Reinforcing Solzhenitsyn’s appeal for an end to censorship, Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov wrote a remarkable essay entitled “Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,” which first appeared in *samizdat* and was subsequently telephoned to the West and published in *The New York Times* in July 1968. Sakharov declared that “intellectual freedom is essential to human society—freedom to obtain and distribute information, freedom for open-minded and unfearing debate and freedom from pressure by officialdom and prejudices.”²⁹ Without such freedom, a people become susceptible to the “mass myths” perpetuated by “treacherous hypocrites and demagogues” that “can be transformed into bloody dictatorship.”³⁰ Among these myths are “the myth about the sharpening of the class struggle and proletarian infallibility bolstered by the cult of Stalin and by exaggeration of the contradictions with capitalism in the Soviet Union.”³¹ A people, he went on, come

to "despise oppression, dogmatism and demagoguery (and the extreme manifestations—racism, Fascism, Stalinism and Maoism)." ³² In one fell swoop, Sakharov jettisoned the major tenets of Communism, relegating them to pernicious myths, and destroyed the very ideological basis of the political system and the Marxist interpretation of class struggle and history.

Sakharov also came to the aid of the victims of the three political trials mentioned earlier. In the strongest terms, he criticized the procedural violations and the irregularities of the trials and the acts of political repression taken against their sympathizers. "Was it not disgraceful," he asked, "to allow the arrest, twelve-month detention without trial and then the conviction and sentencing... for what actually amounted to a defense of civil liberties?" ³³ He also cited Article 190 of the Criminal Code, which was amended after the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial to include literary protests among punishable acts against the political system. The amendment invoked a new principle of analogy; that is, a person who fails to report a crime may be prosecuted and punished as severely as the person who commits the actual crime. Sakharov attacked this amendment for being "in direct contravention of the civil rights proclaimed by our Constitution." ³⁴ Again, here was the unorthodox dissenting comparison between the dictates of the Constitution and those of the political system.

Sakharov argued, furthermore, that "freedom of thought is under triple threat in modern society—from the opium of mass culture, from cowardly, egotistic and narrow-minded ideologies, and from the ossified dogmatism of a bureaucratic oligarchy and its favourite weapon, ideological censorship." ³⁵ Sakharov had already equated fascism with dogmatism and bloody dictatorship. Now he charged that censorship was a tool of a bureaucratic oligarchy which stifled free expression in order to maintain its power over men.

Sakharov contended that the treatment of Solzhenitsyn and other writers had "clearly

shown how incompetent censorship destroys the living soul of Soviet literature; but the same applies, of course, to all other manifestations of social thought, causing stagnation and dullness and preventing fresh and deep ideas." ³⁶ He called for more than mere adjustment in the system: "the situation involving censorship (*Glavlit*) in our country is such that it can hardly be corrected for any length of time simply by 'liberalized' directives." ³⁷ "Major organizational and legislative measures are required," ³⁸ which he said would permit the free exchange of ideas so "that we can get to know ourselves better" ³⁹ and so that valid social science research can "be conducted not only according to government-controlled programs." ⁴⁰

Sakharov, then, expanded the notion of freedom in an ideological system. The writers wanted political and intellectual freedom in order to portray life realistically, warts and all; Sakharov said that intellectual freedom is "essential" to a society in order to provide an antidote to the virus of dictatorships. "Today, the key to a progressive restructuring of the system of government in the interests of mankind lies in intellectual freedom." ⁴¹

He also called for both the intelligentsia and the working class (from which the intellectuals were supposedly drawn in classical Marxism) to jointly oppose censorship in the best interests of society. He denied that there was any valid distinction between the interests of the working class and the intelligentsia or that the intelligentsia had interests other than those of the workers who were theoretically represented by the Party.

During the conflict between the liberal intelligentsia and the party apparatus over censorship, the neo-Stalinists sought to preempt any possible support for the intelligentsia from the workers by claiming that the two groups had dissimilar interests and that the true interest of the workers was found in the Party. By denying any valid distinction between the interest of the workers and the intellectuals and their mutual goals, Sakharov was actually challenging the preeminence of the Party as the only legitimate force striving for the interests of

the workers. What Sakharov argued was that the Party was no longer serving the interests of the workers, but its own interests as a ruling clique. By establishing the subordination of all interests to the will of the Party, the Party apparatus had established itself as a "bureaucratic elite from which all key positions are filled and which is rewarded for its work through open and concealed privileges."⁴²

Moreover, he asked one of the most daring questions posed by a Communist in the entire history of the Soviet Union: "Who will guarantee that these officials always express the genuine interests of the working class as a whole and the genuine interests of progress rather than their own caste interests?"⁴³ Sakharov, in effect, challenged the very legitimacy of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the revolution and its premier position in Soviet society. His argument here was the same as the one advanced by the Yugoslav dissident Miroslav Djilas in *The New Class*, namely, that the Party had arrogated to itself the major positions of responsibility and privilege at the expense of the working class and society as a whole. The party presented the needs of society as its own needs, the first of which was to perpetuate its own rule. To accomplish this end, it employed total censorship to squelch the free interplay of thought, eliminating any possible criticism of its structure or activities.

In Marxist theory, the Party is the only real representative of the working class. As early as 1903 in the Bolshevik-Menshevik controversy, Lenin successfully argued that the Party should be well-organized, small, and disciplined; Stalin institutionalized the concept of the Party as the governing elite of the new Soviet state before destroying most of it during the purges and replacing its victims with comrades loyal only to him. Sakharov challenged the role of the Party, not only on ideological grounds, but also by the fact that it demonstrably no longer represents the best interests of the working class and that the workers and the intellectuals must find an alternative to it. Sakharov destroyed the ideological basis of the rule of the Party in the Soviet Union with this analysis.

As mentioned earlier, if unorthodox dissent "involves primarily the intellectual rejection of the system,"⁴⁴ Sakharov's critique more than fulfilled the requirements. However, he went even further. In order to improve the system, he proposed to replace it with a new coalition of workers and intellectuals.

In November 1970, Sakharov and two of his colleagues formed a "Committee for Human Rights," which sought ways of guaranteeing personal freedoms within the existing Party-dominated system. A month later, Solzhenitsyn became a corresponding member. The rules of membership stated that only those who were not members of a political party or other organizations that strove to participate in the ruling of the state could join. This automatically ruled out members of the Communist Party, the only legal political party in the Soviet Union.

Article 126 of the Constitution entitles Soviet citizens the right to form public organizations, while adding that the Communist Party is "the leading core of all organizations of working people both public and private." Article 72 of the Criminal Code, however, makes it a serious crime to participate in an "anti-Soviet organization." Again, as in the Bukovsky trial, the issue was one of constitutionality versus the Criminal Code. But what was even more significant was the fact that by excluding Party members, the Committee for Human Rights was implicitly setting itself up as a possible alternative to the Party itself.

Sakharov has long called for a multi-party state, in which several parties would compete for leadership. Whether or not this was the motivation behind the founding of the Human Rights Committee is a matter of conjecture. But the formation of the group shows a boldness designed to give dissent an organized voice and a more coherent body of thought. Its establishment, in itself, is one of the most concrete forms of unorthodox dissent to appear in the Soviet Union in many years.

Continuing his activities, Sakharov was increasingly threatened by the KGB. Events reached such a point in 1973 that Dr. Philip

Handler, president of the US National Academy of Sciences, felt compelled to send a cable to his Soviet counterpart, Dr. Mstislav V. Keldysh, president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In this cablegram, Handler stated that "were Sakharov [a foreign associate of the US Academy] to be deprived of his opportunity to serve the Soviet people and humanity, it would be extremely difficult to imagine successful fulfillment of American pledges of bi-national scientific cooperation."⁴⁵ We have already noted the even more spectacular and potentially farther-reaching example of outside support recently tendered to Sakharov by President Carter.

The Soviet political elite's response to these dissenters has been—aside from the previously noted expulsion of Solzhenitsyn—a campaign of incarceration "in labor camps or mental hospitals, supplemented by the linking of dissenters with Western imperialism or 'international Zionism' and other variations of familiar propaganda themes."⁴⁶ Sakharov has yet to be dealt with so harshly, but after his recent allegations that the KGB engages in criminal activities, he could very well disappear into one of the anonymous gulags. Whether the cumulative effect of the increasing chorus of Western protest and support will benefit or harm Sakharov and the others—or whether it will bring about any material change in either the rules or the stakes in Russia's international game—is impossible to predict. Each passing day seems to bring some new development. Only one thing appears certain: The Soviet political leadership, however, will still have to answer, to the eventual satisfaction of its own citizens, the very real issue that has been so eloquently raised by the unorthodox dissenters: "how to keep [our] people at peace and at work without the freedoms they have come to consider necessary."⁴⁷

NOTES

1. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 104.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
6. Sergius Yakobson and Robert V. Allen, *Aspects of Intellectual Ferment and Dissent in the Soviet Union* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 13.
7. "Dissent in Russia: The Thin Wedge," *Newsweek*, 1 February 1971, p. 29.
8. L. Labedz and M. Hayward, *On Trial* (London: Harvill Press, 1967), p. 260.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 308.
18. *Newsweek*, p. 33.
19. Stephen Weiner, "Soviet Legality on Trial," *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1968), 35.
20. Yakobson and Allen, p. 35.
21. Weiner, p. 13.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
26. Yakobson and Allen, p. 36.
27. Weiner, p. 38.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
29. Andrei D. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 25.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
44. Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 117.
45. Stuart Auerbach, "Soviets Scored on Sakharov," *The Washington Post*, 10 September 1973, p. A1.
46. Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case," *Problems of Communism* (March-April 1973), 45.
47. "Hunger for Rights Spurring Open Protests in Soviet Bloc," *The New York Times*, 31 January 1977, p. A1.

